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It has long been understood that political knowledge in the U.S. is very low.  For those 
who care about the quality of American democracy, this is a big problem. In attempting 
to find a solution, many people often blame education. While increasing civic knowledge 
is a laudatory goal, increased political sophistication does not necessarily turn 
individuals into good democratic citizens. Research in cognitive and social psychology 
paints a picture of people as motivated reasoners. Instead of having an open-minded 
engagement with issues, individuals typically only seek, see, and understand 
information in a manner that reinforces what they already believe. Here, we examine  
motivated reasoning and argue that the strongest partisans and the most committed 
ideologues will be the most susceptible to holding contradictory policy positions with 
regard to same-sex marriage and religious freedom. 
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The importance of civic literacy is, and has long been, an axiom of democratic theory; a 
“generally-accepted belief that civic knowledge is an important foundation of democratic self-
government” (McCabe and Kennedy 2014). Americans generally agree that a basic 
understanding of the structure and philosophy of government is a necessary precondition for 
productive political engagement or policy debate; a mutual understanding of the constitutional 
framework, and that  agreement on the meaning of basic legal, economic and scientific 
terminology is necessary if there is to be common ground for discussion. 
 
Former U.S. Representative Lee Hamilton summarized this consensus, writing in 2003 
The truth is, for our democracy to work, it needs not just an engaged citizenry, but an 
informed one. We’ve known this since the nation’s earliest days. The creators of the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 thought the notion important enough to enshrine it 
in the state’s founding document: “Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused 
generally among the body of the people,” they wrote, are “necessary for the preservation 
of rights and liberties. 
 
Those who are concerned about America’s toxic political environment contend that the lack of 
accurate, basic civic information is the major culprit, and civic ignorance is at the root of 
American’s current polarization.  That belief may be misplaced, or at the least, oversimplified. 
The widespread concern over the polity’s admittedly low levels of civic knowledge fails to take 
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into account recent research on motivated reasoning, which is the often unconscious selective 
perception and interpretation of information so as to reinforce beliefs already held. The 
troubling findings in this research are that such reasoning is, if anything, more likely to occur 
among more sophisticated voters than with their less politically knowledgeable peers. Political 
scientists and pundits alike are left with the question: Which matters most? Which is more likely 
to predict increased political polarization, civic ignorance or ideological rigidity, and how do 
these factors interact? 
 
A copious literature confirms the existence of a civic deficit: Only 36 percent of American 
citizens can correctly name the three branches of government (Annenberg Public Policy Center 
Judicial Survey 2007); 36 percent of 12th grade students fail to achieve a basic level of civic 
knowledge (National Center for Education Statistics 2011); and, only 35.5 percent of American 
teenagers can correctly identify “We the People” as the first three words of the U.S. Constitution 
(National Constitution Center Survey 1998). The National Assessment of Education Progress 
(NAEP) 2010 report on civic competencies found that barely a quarter of the country’s 4th, 8th 
and 12th graders could be considered proficient in civics (National Center for Education 
Statistics 2011). Numerous other studies confirm the extent of our civic deficit (Bennett 1995; 
Caplan 2008; Converse 2000; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1991, 1996; Shaker 2012). 
 
Given the strength of the evidence demonstrating a broad public deficit of accurate civic 
information, a growing number of researchers and educators are working to identify best 
practices and to improve civic education in the schools. Peter Levine at the Center for 
Information and Research on Civic Learning and Civic Engagement (CIRCLE), Ted McConnell, 
Director of the National Council for the Social Studies Campaign for the Civic Mission of the 
Schools, Shawn Healy, Chair of Illinois’ Civic Mission Coalition, Joseph Kahne, Director of Civic 
Engagement Research, and Diana Hess of the Spencer Foundation, and the Center for Civic 
Literacy at IUPUI are involved in just a few of the scholarly efforts currently underway. They are 
joined by a variety of programmatic endeavors.  Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s ICivics, the Bar Foundation’s sponsorship of the Center for Civic Education’s “We 
the People” curriculum and competition, and several others are also involved in these efforts. 
 
These initiatives to raise awareness of the issue and to identify measures that may ameliorate it 
are important. At the very least, a shared understanding of basic social and political institutions 
is necessary for communication to occur— a common reality, after all, is much like a common 
language.  If we are looking to improvements in civic knowledge to reverse the political 
polarization that has paralyzed so much of our political system, however, the emergence of new 
lines of research in political psychology suggests we may well be disappointed. 
 
In what follows, first we show that education or increased political interest and awareness are 
not enough to defeat the pernicious effects of a highly-polarized political system. Extant 
research (our own research included), routinely finds that the politically sophisticated are also 
the most partisan (Federico and Hunt 2013). Second, we argue that when these highly-polarized 
politically-sophisticated individuals engage in politics, motivated reasoning (Kunda 1987, 1990) 
produces a rather paradoxical result. Those with the strongest partisan ties and the most 
extreme ideological views are also more likely to hold inconstant political beliefs. In other words, 
the strongest partisans and most committed ideologues will also be the most susceptible to 
policy contradictions because they never look critically at the totality of what they believe. When 
they think about politics, they are motivated to only “see” that which confirms what they already 
believe. Third, we test this idea with the case of individuals’ beliefs about same-sex marriage and 
religious freedom. This produces two important findings. First, the most ideologically- 
conservative individuals are those most likely to espouse a belief that government should not tell 
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religious organizations who they can and cannot marry, while also believing that same-sex 
marriage should be banned. Second, this effect of motivated reasoning is more pronounced 
among Republican-identifying conservatives than Democrat-identifying conservatives.  
 
Political Polarization 
 
Theoretically, in order to have a productive argument, the participants need to have at least a 
basic agreement on the definitions of the terms being employed and the facts involved. The 
recent debates about the Affordable Care Act—aka “Obamacare”—is a case in point. Citizens 
debating that legislation may have very different opinions about the wisdom of the policy 
choices involved, but decisions to repeal, implement, or amend the Act should be based upon 
agreement about what it actually says and does. If opposition to the policy is based upon “death 
panels” that don’t exist, or its defense is based upon an insistence that the individual mandate 
isn’t government coercion, the likelihood of reasoned discussion—let alone agreement on policy 
changes—disappears. 
 
A similar example would be the ongoing battles over religion in the nation’s schools. There are 
genuine arguments to be made about the proper application of the Establishment Clause in the 
context of public education, but reasoned disputes require people who recognize that the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses require government neutrality in matters of religious exercise. 
 
We certainly agree with those who advocate for the importance of a shared vocabulary and a 
conceptual common ground to facilitate legitimate and productive political debate and discourse. 
A common civic language—an agreement on the basic nature of our shared political reality—is 
necessary, but it may not be sufficient. An examination of two robust literatures, political 
science research on political polarization and partisan sorting, and political psychology research 
on motivated reasoning, strongly suggests that efforts to calm the political waters by supplying 
accurate information, while necessary, may be inadequate for the task. 
 
A comprehensive review of the literature on political polarization was conducted by Morris P. 
Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams in 2008. Fiorina and Abrams surveyed the extant research, 
testing the “polarization narrative” that began in the early 1990s when Pat Buchanan famously 
“declared a culture war for the soul of America in his speech at the 1992 Republican convention” 
(Fiorina and Abrams 2008). They noted the emergence of the “notorious red-blue map” after 
the 2000 election and the acceptance of the polarization narrative by commentators and pundits 
(one of whom went so far as to compare Republicans and Democrats to Sunnis and Shias). 
Although the authors noted their agreement with the scholarly consensus that elites and 
Congress had indeed, polarized their review of the then available research, this convinced them 
that the situation for the public at large reflected partisan sorting rather than polarization. 
 
The political positions of Americans had not become more polarized between the early 
1970s and the early 2000s. Importantly, however, within the larger population the 
parties in the electorate had become more distinct. This change was a product of two 
other senses of polarization that the DiMaggio group identified: constraint (“the more 
closely associated different social attitudes become.”) and consolidation (“ . . . the greater 
the extent to which social attitudes become correlated with salient individual 
characteristics or identities.”) (DiMaggio et al. 1996, p.693) In the last few decades of the 
twentieth century, inter-issue correlations were increasing, and partisans were becoming 
more closely associated with one or the other of the increasingly interconnected clusters” 
(Fiorina and Abrams 2008). 
 
Does Ignorance Matter? 
62 
 
Whether this differentiation is called sorting or polarization, the authors agreed with other 
observers that it had occurred and appeared to be continuing. And they conceded that other 
scholars, notably Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) “believe that the process of partisan sorting 
has proceeded so far that it is accurate to speak of a polarized America.”  
 
In the wake of Fiorina and Abrams’ influential and much-cited review, a number of other 
researchers have studied the phenomenon, with most agreeing that the partisan divide is 
increasing, especially among elites and in Congress (see, for example, Krasa and Polborn 2012).  
 
To further complicate the search for common ground and collaborative policymaking, several 
political psychologists have found that partisans who are often quite well informed will reject 
“negatively valenced” information if that information is in conflict with their preferred 
worldview (Redlawsk, Civettini and Emmerson 2010), and still others have concluded that 
personality traits can predict a “considerable array of human behavioral patterns” (Ha, Kim and 
Jo 2013), including political preferences and behaviors. Indeed, Alford, Funk and Hibbing 
(2005), and Fowler, Baker and Dawes (2008), among others, have concluded that certain 
political behaviors and attitudes are genetically influenced and/or heritable. Personality traits—
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability and openness to experience, 
sometimes referred to as the “Big Five,” have demonstrable effects upon political behavior (Ha, 
Kim and Jo 2013). 
 
Polarization, Political Sophistication, and Motivated Reasoning 
 
Motivated reasoning research poses challenges to widely-held beliefs about the way in which 
individuals search for information. Theoretically, when people are engaged in learning about the 
world around them, the primary goal is accuracy. The good citizen watches the news and reads 
newspapers or blogs as part of an effort to gain an accurate understanding of the particular topic 
under investigation. Unfortunately, as emerging research underscores, this is not how people 
actually go about gathering information, if they choose to gather it at all.  The reality is that 
people are motivated reasoners (Kunda 1987, 1990).  
 
The concept of motivated reasoning is built on decades of research documenting the biased 
cognitive processes by which individuals gather and understand new information. It is an 
unconscious process that occurs through selective perceptions of reality. Once people have 
developed a worldview--an idea about how something works, or what they like and do not like--
they are extremely resistant to information that would require them to change that worldview.  
 
Research confirms that most people do not engage in a wide search for information in order to 
understand a subject from various perspectives. Instead, they engage in selective exposure 
(Lodge, Taber, and Galonsky 1999; Mutz and Martin 2001; Sweeney and Gruber 1984), which 
means that they seek out information that will confirm what they already know (or think they 
know) and avoid information sources that might challenge their beliefs.  While it may be 
difficult to avoid all contrary information, encountering contradictory facts will not usually 
require the individual to change or adapt a preexisting framework. When people are faced with a 
variety of information, some that is confirmatory and some not, they simply ignore or actively 
argue against the evidence they don’t like while uncritically accepting the data seen as 
confirmatory (Ditto and Lopez 1992; Lavine, Borgida, and Sullivan 2000; Taber and Lodge 
2006). Furthermore, when faced with ambiguous information, people do not spend time 
learning more about the topic; instead, they interpret the ambiguous information so that it is 
consistent with their current beliefs (Fazio and Williams 1986; Lord, Ross and Lepper 1979; 
Vidmar and Rokeach 1974).  
Journal of Public and Nonprofit Affairs 
63 
 
The consequences of motivated reasoning for politics can be quite troubling. This is especially 
the case when we consider its effects on a political system in which political polarization is 
increasing, both within elites and the general public (Abramowitz 2010; Bishop 2008; Theriault 
2008). As we have seen, the combination of motivated reasoning and increased partisanship 
leads to more deeply-entrenched beliefs and a corresponding increase in unwillingness to 
compromise as partisans build self-serving, motivated realities. Barker and Carman’s (2012) 
recent work documents how different the realities are for citizens in Red versus Blue states, and 
Levendusky (2009) demonstrates how the increased sorting of average citizens into partisan 
camps has produced more polarized emotional responses to the parties. Politics thus becomes 
an “us versus them” competition. Taber, Cann, and Kucsova (2009) also find strong support for 
the polarizing effect of biased information processing (see also Slothuus and de Vreese 2010).  
 
Indeed, the simple act of counting ballots can be affected by motivated reasoning when the 
counting instructions are vague or ambiguous. In such situations, individuals fill in the gaps in a 
self-serving, highly- partisan way (Kopko et al. 2011).  Finally, Cohen (2003) shows through a 
series of experiments that “even under conditions of effortful processing, attitudes toward a 
social policy depended almost exclusively upon the stated positions of one’s party.” And to top it 
off, “ . . . participants denied having been influenced by their political group, although they 
believed that other individuals, especially their ideological adversaries, would be so influenced” 
(p. 808). Arguably, this kind of myopic adoption of the positions of one’s party is not what the 
Founding Fathers had in mind.   
 
Education is often proposed as the solution to the problem of political ignorance (Putnam 
2000); it is thus reasonable to consider whether it can also solve the problem of motivated 
reasoning. Unfortunately, rather than moderating partisanship, political knowledge is often 
connected to an increase in polarization.  Education has certainly been shown to be a good 
predictor of political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Price and Zaller 1993), and it is 
equally demonstrable that politically knowledgeable citizens are those most likely to acquire 
political information and most able to incorporate it into their existing knowledge framework 
(Zaller 1992). A recent study by Gillion, Ladd, and Meredith (2013) showed that the gender gap 
in voting occurred first among the highly educated because they were the first to be aware of 
elite polarization. Claassen and Highton (2009) find the same dynamic. Polarization among 
party elites leads those individuals who are the most politically aware to follow suit. In a similar 
vein, Federico and Hunt (2013) show that individuals who are highly knowledgeable and heavily 
invested in politics are more likely to approach politics in an ideological fashion, and more likely 
to exhibit a polarized response to politics (see also Abramowitz 2010; Federico 2007; Judd and 
Krosnick 1989; Sidanius and Lau 1989; Zaller 2004).  
 
The dilemma posed by what we now know about motivated reasoning is that it occurs no matter 
how educated or sophisticated the individual.  In his examination of partisan sorting, 
Levendusky (2009) shows that the highly knowledgeable are just as likely to change their 
ideology to match their partisanship as the politically unsophisticated. Political theorists might 
hope that the politically sophisticated would privilege policy positions over their devotion to the 
correct “team,” but this is apparently not the case.  In other somewhat disheartening research, 
Hartman and Newmark (2012) examined the motivated reasoning behind the belief that 
President Obama is a Muslim.  It is not a shock to learn that this belief is stronger among 
Republicans than Democrats, but the fact that political sophistication does not appear to 
attenuate it is distressing.  
 
To summarize, there is strong evidence indicating that political sophistication, rather than 
moderating partisan commitments, actually contributes to partisan polarization. We argue that 
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this strengthening of the connection of the most highly engaged to a particular party is then 
reinforced through selective perception. That is, individuals “see” only that which confirms their 
existing beliefs. Thus, selective perception does not cause their beliefs but helps support them. 
As a result, we theorize that the strongest partisans and most committed ideologues will also be 
the most susceptible to policy contradictions because they never look critically at the totality of 
what they believe, but simply see small independent confirmations of one belief or another at a 
time.  
 
Connecting Political Sophistication to Polarization—Data and Methods 
 
In order to examine the effect of political sophistication and motivated reasoning on 
polarization and holding contradictory policy beliefs, we conducted a national survey measuring 
partisanship, ideology, and political knowledge. In addition, we asked specific questions about 
same-sex marriage. The survey was an online survey designed and hosted using Qualtrics online 
survey software.  Survey Sampling International (SSI) was then contracted to provide over 
2,300 respondents. SSI maintains national online panels of respondents and recruits 
participants from across the web using numerous methods, which gives them the ability to reach 
nearly anyone who uses the Internet.  
 
For our survey, a quota method was used in order to match the survey’s demographic and 
gender distribution to that of the overall United States. Thus, this is not a representative sample 
of the U.S. population.  However, since we were not attempting to estimate characteristics of the 
U.S. population (for example, the percentage of the population who voted in the 2012 
presidential election), this does not affect our results. We are interested in understanding the 
connection between cognitive processes and political beliefs. We are unaware of any variable 
that is correlated with participation in any of SSI’s panels and these cognitive processes that, if 
present, would bias these results. Furthermore, we control for numerous demographic and 
political variables, which further alleviates any concern about bias in the sample.  
We produce two models. The first is designed to explain the source of the strength of 
respondents’ party identification. As discussed above, it is not controversial to claim that the 
most politically sophisticated are also the most partisan members of the electorate. We want to 
document this relationship in our data for two more compelling reasons. First, it provides yet 
another piece of research documenting this relationship and, second, because the second 
analysis focuses on showing preference contradiction, it will demonstrate that those who are the 
most highly partisan and ideological are the ones who are the  most likely to suffer from this 
failure, and (as shown in this first model) they  also happen to be the most politically 
sophisticated.   
 
The survey contained standard questions designed to identify respondents’ partisanship 
following the method used in each American National Election Studies (ANES) survey.2 This 
survey produces a seven-point scale ranging from strong Democrats on the left to strong 
Republicans on the right.  Since we are interested in understanding the causes of polarization, 
we are more concerned with what drives individuals to the poles of these scales rather than what 
causes them to choose one side or the other. Therefore, we fold this scale so that it ranges from 
independent (coded 0), leaning/weak partisan (coded 1), partisan (coded 2), and strong partisan 
(coded 3), resulting in a scale measuring respondents’ strength of partisan attachment (e.g., 
Dolan and Holbrook 2001).   
                                                 
2 Whenever possible, we simply copied the long-established question wording used by either the American 
National Election Studies or General Social Survey. This provides for easy comparability and avoids the 
need to reestablish the credibility of survey question wording, since these are well- established and well- 
understood survey instruments.  
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We are interested in capturing the effects of political sophistication, which is not just about 
political knowledge or education.  Therefore, we include measures of political knowledge, 
education, and, most importantly, their interaction as key predictors of partisan strength. 
Political knowledge is measured on a nine-point scale and based on respondents’ ability to 
answer eight factual questions (Zaller 1992). These questions are copied directly from ANES and 
ask respondents to identify (1) Joe Biden, (2) John Boehner, (3) John Roberts, and (4) David 
Cameron; and, whether they know which party controls the (5) House and the (6) Senate, (7) 
which party is more conservative, and (8) what the current unemployment rate is. Education is 
measured on a seven-point scale that indicates the highest level of educational attainment by the 
respondent.  
 
Finally, the model also includes several standard control variables: Gender (coded 1 if male, 0 if 
female), race/ethnicity (1 if white, 0 otherwise), age (coded in years), household income (coded 
on a 10 point scale), and religious fundamentalism.  This last variable is based on a General 
Social Survey question tapping respondents’ beliefs about the Bible as follows:  
Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? 
 
 The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word. 
 The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, 
word for word. 
 The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by 
men. 
 
This produces a three-point scale ranging from most (coded 0) to least (coded 2) religious 
fundamentalist. 
The second model predicts a contradiction in the policy beliefs among respondents. Our survey 
asks two questions about religious freedom and same-sex marriage: 1) should same-sex couples 
be allowed to marry, or do you think they should not be allowed to marry? And 2) Do you think 
the federal or state governments should make laws regarding who religious organizations can 
and cannot marry? If one answers “no” to the second question, one should then not answer that 
same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry because that would be making a law restricting 
a religious organization’s marriage policies. This is an instance of individuals contradicting 
themselves on policy grounds. However, it may not necessarily be a contradiction for 
conservative Republicans who hold strong beliefs about smaller government and the legality of 
same-sex marriage. An individual engaged in motivated reasoning should be expected to make 
such a contradiction, with the strongest partisans and ideologues being the most susceptible. 
Thus, the comparison of respondents’ answers to these two questions produces our measure of 
policy contradiction.  
 
The key independent variables in this case are partisanship and ideology. While our general 
theory does not point specifically to one party or the other, when we operationalize a specific 
case of policy contraction, there arises the need to identify a specific party and ideological 
leaning. This is because not all partisanships or ideological leanings respond to specific issues in 
the same way. In this case, the issue is religious freedom and same-sex marriage. The more 
conservative and the more Republican one is, the more likely s/he is to answer these questions 
in a manner consistent with being a conservative Republican rather than in a consistent manner. 
The key to motivated reasoning is that partisanship and ideology interact to produce an effect 
that moves people away from a purely rational thought process by which one either does not 
accept government intervention in religious choices, and thus accepts religious organization’s 
decision to marry same-sex couples, or one is happy with government intervention in religious 
choices, and thus is okay with banning same-sex marriage. Simultaneously, disliking 
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government restrictions on religion and liking government banning of same-sex marriage is the 
product of current partisan and ideological thinking.  Those who engage in it are motivated to do 
so in order to protect their preferred set of beliefs through a form of self-affirmation (Steele 
1988). Kahan (2013) finds strong evidence for this. His research shows that individuals are 
motivated to engage in information processing that reinforces their connection to important 
ideological groups, in this case a conservative self-identity. Following this line of reasoning, our 
 
 
Table 1: Predicting Strength of Party Identification and Policy Preference 
Contradiction 
             Dependent Variable 
     Strength of   Preference  
Variable    Party ID   Contradiction 
 
Political Knowledge   0.232***   0.050 
     (0.026)   (0.031) 
Education    0.207***   -0.011 
     (0.035)   (0.046) 
Pol. Know. x Education  -0.037*** 
     (0.007) 
Ideology    -0.064***   0.420*** 
     (0.014)   (0.065) 
Republican        -0.564 
         (0.432) 
Ideology x Republican      0.284** 
         (0.110) 
Independent         0.486* 
         (0.196) 
 
Control Variables 
Male     -0.150***   0.200 
     (0.043)   (0.126) 
White     -0.076    -0.121 
     (0.045)   (0.137) 
Age     0.005***   0.018*** 
     (0.001)   (0.004) 
Household Income   0.002    -0.043 
     (0.00)    (0.022) 
Religious Fundamentalism  -0.220***   -0.800*** 
     (0.030)   (0.092) 
Constant    1.255***   -2.433*** 
     (0.145)    (0.350) 
N     2237    2244 
R2     0.10 
Log pseudolikelihood       -912.18 
Notes: Strength of Party ID estimated using OLS. (Since this is a short scale running form 0-3, an ordered logit model 
was also estimated. The substantive results were identical, and therefore, the OLS results are presented here for easy 
of interpretation.) The Preference Contradiction model is estimated using logit.  
*= p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001, two-tailed.  
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supposition is that this effect should be most pronounced among the most extreme partisans 
and ideologues.   
  
We measure partisanship as a set of dummy variables:  (1) Republican, coded 1 if one identifies 
as Republican and 0 otherwise; (2) Democrat, coded 1 if one identifies as Democrat and 0 
otherwise; and, (3) Independent, coded 2 if one is independent and 0 otherwise.  The Democrat 
variable is then dropped and becomes the comparison group for Republican and Independent 
when interpreting the results.3  Ideology is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 0 
(strong liberal) to 6 (strong conservative), with a score of 3 indicating independent or non-
ideological. We then interact ideology with the Republican dummy variable in order to test for 
the conditional effect of each on the dependent variable. Finally, the model also includes the 
same control variables as the model predicting partisan strength above.  
 
Table 1 presents results after estimation of the two models. The results of an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS)4 regression model predicting strength of party identification are presented in the 
first column, while the results of a logit model predicting the likelihood of holding contradictory 
beliefs about religious freedom and same-sex marriage are presented in column two. Focusing 
first on the model predicting partisan strength, one can see that political knowledge, education, 
and their interaction are all highly statistically significant. This means that the effect of political 
knowledge on strength of partisanship is conditional on the value of education, and vice versa. 
The negative sign indicates that the effect of one variable diminishes as the value of the other 
goes up.  
 
Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Political Knowledge and Education on Strength of 
Party Identification 
 
                                                 
3 See Wooldridge (2012) for an explanation as to why one of these variables needs to be dropped.   
4 Strength of Party ID was estimated using OLS. but since this is a short scale running form 0-3, an 
ordered logit model was also estimated. The substantive results were identical, and therefore, the OLS 
results are presented here for easy of interpretation. 
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Interaction effects are notoriously difficult to substantively interpret from an output table, thus, 
Figure 1 presents a graphical look at how the effect of political knowledge changes as the highest 
level of educational attainment moves from having a high school diploma, to a college degree, to 
a graduate degree. Figure 1 makes it clear that the effect of increasing political knowledge is 
strongest for those having only finished high school.  Moving from a political knowledge score of 
2 to a score of 7 is associated with an increase in partisan strength of about 3/4 of a point. That 
is an 18 percent jump in one’s partisan leanings. The same type of gain in political knowledge for 
someone with a graduate degree shows virtually no movement in the strength of their 
partisanship. Interestingly, at low levels of political knowledge, people with a high school 
diploma are the least partisan, while at the highest levels of political knowledge, they are the 
most partisan.  Therefore, it would seem that gaining political knowledge without education has 
a polarizing effect on people. This is a disturbing result for those advocating civic learning 
outside of formal education. It would appear that this may simply exacerbate polarization.  
 
Returning to Table 1, the logit model estimating policy preference contradiction includes an 
interaction between ideology and Republican identification. The interaction and ideology 
variables reach significance, but the Republican variable does not. This is not particularly 
surprising since the substantive meaning of that variable is the effect of being a Republican 
when compared to a Democrat when ideology equals zero, which represents strong liberalism. 
There are likely very few strongly-liberal Republicans, and the data cannot tell the difference 
between them and Democrats. The significant interaction indicates, once again, that the effect of 
partisanship is dependent on ideology, and vice versa. Before looking at Figure 2, which helps 
clarify the interactive effect of ideology and partisanship, it should be noted that political 
knowledge and education fail to reach significance. Thus, there is no evidence in this data that 
political sophistication, as measured by either education or political knowledge, helps 
individuals avoid contradicting themselves. This is what one would expect when the driving 
force behind policy preferences is not rational calculation, but motivated reasoning to answer 
questions in a way that is consistent with one’s partisan and ideological positions.  
 
Figure 2 presents the predictive margins of the conditional effect of partisanship and ideology 
on the probability of contradicting oneself. As can be seen, on the left-hand side of the scale 
(scores 0-2), which corresponds to liberal ideological leanings, there appears to be no 
discernable difference between Republicans and Democrats. But when one moves to the right-
hand side (scores 4-6), which corresponds to increasingly conservative leanings, Republicans 
and Democrats respond much differently. To be sure, both see an increase in the probability of 
contradicting themselves, but the slope for Republicans is much steeper.  For a strong 
conservative (score of 6), the probability of contradiction is about 23 percent greater if one is a 
Republican than a Democrat. Indeed, simply moving from a strong liberal to a strong 
conservative increases the probability of contradiction for Republicans by nearly 60 percent and 
about 35 percent for Democrats. This is the effect of motivated reasoning and it strongly 
supports our contention that it is the highly partisan ideologues that are most susceptible to 
holding contradictory policy beliefs.  
 
Is Civic Literacy Irrelevant? 
 
If motivated reasoning “trumps” accurate information, will our politics inevitably be ideological 
and polarized? Is the effort to provide credible, evidence-based information a fools’ errand? Not 
necessarily. Redlawsk, Civettini and Emmerson (2010) explored this very question.  The authors 
did   not  challenge  the  research   on  motivated  reasoning, but  they  did test  the thesis  that  a 
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Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Ideology and Partisanship on the Probability of 
Holding Contradictory Policy Preferences 
 
 
  
 “tipping point” could be reached—that despite the tendency of motivated reasoners to ignore 
evidence inconsistent with their preferred beliefs (here, a candidate they viewed positively)—
given enough negative information, attitude change would occur. They find some support for 
this notion. Although the research is encouraging, it remains to be seen whether a tipping point 
exists to the extent that ideology concedes to evidence. Learning that a favored candidate is not 
as admirable as once thought is one thing; accepting evolution or climate change and adjusting 
one’s literalist approach to religion accordingly is quite another.   
 
Finally, if research tells us anything, it is that good information and civic literacy are 
necessary, but insufficient at ridding us of polarization and a highly selective approach to 
evidence. The alarming result presented here is that individuals who are supposed to be the best 
examples of democratic citizens this country has to offer, i.e., the politically sophisticated are 
also the ones that are the most partisan and the most susceptible to holding contradictory beliefs 
(at least in the context of same-sex marriage and religious freedom). Unfortunately, it would 
seem that ignorance isn’t the only enemy of reason and political compromise.  
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